A recent review of satellite imagery shows that UAE forces may be pulling their surface to air missile systems out from key deployment locations within Yemen.
Left: DigitalGlobe imagery of the Patriot site in Aden dated 08OCT16 / Right: 24OCT16
Imagery reviewed by Offiziere.ch confirms that UAE Patriots departed from at least two of their three known deployment locations within the country. Equipment previously deployed at Aden International Airport and Al Anad airbase was not visible in recent imagery updates.
The site at the southern coastal airport, established in early 2016, previously featured four Patriot transporter erector launchers (or TELs) and associated equipment. The TELs were no longer in residence on the south side of the airport by late October, according to imagery available in Google Earth. However, UAE armor still remained near the parking apron at the time of capture, but accompanied by a much smaller air element than previously observed.
Similarly, Al Anad airbase, located approximately 30 miles to the north of the airport, had no Patriots on-site as of January 2017. The site, composed of four Patriot TELs, was likely established in early 2016 after the airbase was reportedly attacked by a Tochka ballistic missile in January 2016. We last observed the U.S.-built missile system on imagery at the site in November 2016.
As for the third full battery located in Ma’rib, no high resolution imagery was available at the time of writing for analysis. DigitalGlobe imagery from September 2016 still showed the battery in the ad hoc bermed location. However, our friends over at Planet Labs sent us imagery from January 2017 that suggests they’ve probably been relocated, though it’s difficult to be certain due to the lower resolution.
While we’ve yet to confirm their destination, it’s likely some may make their way over to Assab, given the level of buildup we’ve monitored recently.
(Click on the image to enlarge)
As for the batteries back in the UAE, imagery confirms that four of the seven identified Patriot sites are without units. The empty batteries are indicated on the map as white triangles while the green triangles represent in-residence batteries. The green square is the UAE Patriot garrison located in the heart of Zayed Military City and the red triangle, the U.S.-deployed Patriots at Al Dhafra.
According to imagery reviewed between 2014-2016, the site located immediately south of the UAE Naval College (northwest of the Patriot garrison) often fields up to four additional batteries, possibly a jumped unit from one of the other sites. This may suggest that only three units were deployed to support Saudi-led operations in Yemen.
However, last year Raytheon was awarded a contract to provide technical assistance for the system in the UAE. As a result, those missing units could be undergoing depot level maintenance. The contract, estimated at $21 million, was obligated at the time of the award and expected to finish by July 2017.
A UAE Patriot site is typically composed of 4 TELs and one AN/MPQ-65 target engagement radar. The variant the UAE ordered, a Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (or PAC-3), supports up to four launch canisters, each with four missiles—as opposed to one PAC-2 missile per canister. Therefore, each full strength UAE PAC-3 unit is capable of launching up to 64 missiles without reloading.
The UAE air defense network is setup for point defense with sites positioned around airfields, population centers and important infrastructure.
The alleged unpredictability of the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, the availability of nuclear warheads and a nuclear weapon delivery system could pose a direct threat to the United States in the long term. This raises the question of how the United States should deal with this looming threat, and what role does China play?
The path to nuclear power
North Korea is one of the countries which became interested in nuclear weapons at a very early point. From 1956, North Korean scientists were able to start gaining experience in the Soviet Union at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna near Moscow. A total of 120-150 North Koreans had been educated there by the 1980s. In September 1959, the Soviet Union eventually signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation with North Korea, which was most likely carried out in response to a similar agreement made between the United States and South Korea in July of the same year. Starting in 1962, the Soviet Union helped North Korea to build the nuclear facilities in Nyŏngbyŏn and supplied them with a 4 MWe light water reactor for research purposes. In 1985, the Soviet Union promised another nuclear reactor if North Korea signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (for more information see Robert A. Wampler, “North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S. Record“, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 87, The National Security Archive, April 25, 2003). Despite North Korea’s agreement to the treaty, the reactor was never delivered. It appears that cooperation with the Soviet Union had come to a standstill due to the political upheavals which took place in the late 1980s. This is also the reason why it is not possible for Russia to exert more influence on the North Korean regime today (Roy, p. 133). However, this has not prevented further development of nuclear weapons under the North Korean regime. In 1986, they already had their own first nuclear reactor (5 MWe) with the aim of using it to produce plutonium. Shortly thereafter, work began on a 50 MWe and a 200 MWe reactor, neither of which, however, were completed. If all three reactors had been functional, it would be possible for North Korea to produce enough plutonium for 50 nuclear bombs each year (Richard Stone, “North Korea’s Nuclear Shell Game“, Science 303, No. 5657, January 23, 2004, p. 453).
The United States believed that in 1994, North Korea had produced enough plutonium using its 5 MWe reactor to build 5-6 nuclear devices. At that time, the US was planning to prevent the creation of enriched plutonium fuel rods with an air strike to the reactor using conventional precision bombs (Bruce Cumings, “Getting North Korea wrong“, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71, No. 4, July 2015, p. 68f). However, this turned out differently: Thanks to the diplomatic efforts of former US President Jimmy Carter, the “Agreed Framework” was signed by the United States and North Korea. In this treaty, it was agreed that North Korea would immediately stop using the three plutonium producing reactors based on the Magnox design in exchange for two US-sponsored 1,000 MWe light water reactors, which were unsuitable for the production of weapons-grade nuclear material (Stone, p. 453). As compensation for the resulting break in power production, the US would fund the delivery of an equivalent amount of oil until the two light water reactors were up and running. Moreover, North Korea pledged to remain part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to fulfil its obligations therein. In the long term, normalising relations was planned between the US and North Korea, which would be accompanied by the establishment of diplomatic relations and the removal of sanctions. The terms of the “Agreed Framework” were completed by negative security assurances of the US and the commitment to a North-South Korean security dialogue. However, the implementation of the “Agreed Framework” failed in 2003 due to inadequate funding and the associated delay due to the resistance of the US Congress, as well as conflicts between the US and North Korea over an alleged covert uranium enrichment programme. Finally, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons permanently in 2003. In response, the six-party talks began in 2004 between North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, the US and Russia, which were eventually discontinued in 2009 following a North Korean missile test, carried out by North Korea as a reaction to US sanctions. At the start of 2016, SIPRI estimated that North Korea had about 10 nuclear warheads, with an unknown operational status. With the atomic bomb test in early September of 2016 at the latest, there seems to be no doubt that North Korea has theoretically entered the club of nuclear weapons possessor states.
The status of the North Korean missile programme
The North Korean missile programme was originally based on the design of the Soviet Scud-B short-range missile, which was acquired from Egypt in the 1980s (Andrea Berger, “Disrupting North Korea’s Military Markets“, Survival 58, No. 3, May 03, 2016, p. 104). The Hwasong-5 is thus a copy of the Scud-B missile, and it displays the same performance data with a range of 300 km and a loading capacity of 1,000 kg. The Hwasong-6, however, is a copy of the Scud-C, which can reach 500 km with a loading capacity of 730 kg. A new technology was first used to develop the Nodong and later, the Hwasong-10. Soviet engineers from the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau, who had been employed in the service of North Korea due to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet defence industry, were heavily involved in the development of these rockets. The Nodong is able to reach approximately 900 km with a loading capacity of 1,000 kg. The Hwasong-10 is based on the R-27 Zyb, a Soviet submarine-based medium-range missile (Mark Fitzpatrick, “North Korean security challenges: a net assessment“, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, p. 130ff). North Korea developed the three-stage Taepodong-2 as a potential intercontinental rocket, which it is assumed can reach approximately 4,000-8,000 km with a loading capacity of 1,000-1,500 kg, and partly relies on Scud technology (Joseph S. Bermudez, “A history of ballistic missile development in the DPRK“, Occasional Paper 2, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, 26). The KN-08, which could be seen in various versions as models for the military parades in 2013 and 2015, is based on Scud technology for the first stage, but on R-27 technology for the second stage. The loading capacity is estimated to be 400 kg, with a target range of approximately 9,000 km. The first test flights probably failed in October 2016, and an operational deployment is only expected in about 10 years (John Schilling, Jeffrey Lewis, and David Schmerler, “A New ICBM for North Korea?“, 38 North, December 22, 2015, p. 2).
Dictator – weapons – girls: by the Guardian staff Dan Chung and Tania Branigan. The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il allowed international media to watch his largest ever military parade in October 2010 – part of the campaign to establish his youngest son Kim Jong-un — then still as the leader-in-waiting.
Negotiation strategy 1: Denuclearisation
Some hurdles are expected in any negotiations between the US and North Korea. Negotiations will only come into question on the side of the US if based on the joint statement made at the fourth round of six-party talks in Beijing on the 19th of September 2005, North Korea initiates the first steps towards denuclearisation and joins the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons once again. From the perspective of the US, extortionate behaviour and failure to comply with agreements must not be rewarded by US concessions. Not only would this give the wrong signal internationally and towards South Korea and Japan, but would also be pretty much unacceptable domestically.
From a North Korean point of view, denuclearisation no longer really comes into question following the successful nuclear test on the 9th of September 2016. Based on the high level of distrust towards the US, nuclear weapons play an important role as a security guarantee. Under Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, the nuclear weapons programme was used as a bargaining chip for the normalisation of relations with the US. However, this no longer seems to be the case and a normalisation of relations under Kim Jong-un is unrealistic in the long-term (Roy, p. 131). Moreover, it is questionable whether the current regime is at all interested in relaxing relations. Not only can the US be used for propaganda purposes as a scapegoat for current grievances, but the regime is also able to legitimise its protective function against alleged US aggression (cf.: B.R. Myers, “Taking North Korea at its word“, NK News, 13th of February 2016). It is therefore highly unlikely that North Korea would agree to denuclearisation – even sanctions nor far-reaching concessions would change anything by the fact.
Negotiation strategy 2: Setting a maximum number of rockets and freezing the rocket programme
Assuming that the nuclear genie cannot be forced back into the bottle, the aim must be a realistic objective adapted to the current situation. In order to satisfy their own security needs, North Korea could be permitted a certain maximum number of nuclear warheads which would not pose a threat to the US due to the missile defence shield (Roy, p. 137f). Associated with this would be a “three noes policy”: no development of nuclear weapons (no nuclear tests either), no transfer of nuclear weapons to other states and no use of nuclear weapons. A similar negotiation strategy would be chosen as that which has already been successfully implemented in the case of Iran (Dingli Shen, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Search for a New Path Forward: A Chinese Response“, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, No. 5, September 02, 2016, p. 345). North Korea would be more likely to accept this negotiation strategy as opposed to denuclearisation. Since the beginning of 2015, the North Korean regime has offered several times to suspend nuclear testing if, in return, the US would dispense with the big military exercises which take place annually with South Korea.
Furthermore, the missile programme could also be frozen as part of the negotiation terms, which means that North Korea would not be able reach the US mainland with the approved nuclear warheads. Of course, South Korea and Japan could not be left to their own fate and would need missile shield, guaranteed by the US. The devil is in the detail: The maximum number of nuclear warheads may have to be sufficient from a North Korean point of view to be able to overcome missile shields in the event of invasion – otherwise this security guarantee would have no practical use in North Korea. However, such a maximum number would hardly be acceptable to the US and its allies. Moreover, the US would logically have to renounce denuclearisation as a precondition for the opening of negotiations, which would be difficult to explain domestically. Opponents of this strategy would justifiably make the criticism that, with the de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power, not only would North Korea come out of the agreement as a winner and an extortionate regime would be rewarded, but also that the nuclear non-proliferation regime would basically be null and void. In the Middle East in particular, other countries could be motivated towards a similarly audacious undertaking.
Sanctions and regime collapse
If a direct negotiation strategy between the US and North Korea does not appear promising, perhaps an indirect way would be to negotiate through an intermediary country which is respected by the United States, and which could have enough influence on North Korea. Only China comes into question here. The voting in the UN Security Council shows that China has no interest in the nuclear armament of North Korea. For example, China voted in favour of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 on the 2nd of March 2016, which was adopted in response to the 4th North Korean nuclear test and includes extensive economic sanctions. Whether China would fully abide by the UN sanctions is questionable, however, as China has more to worry about than just a nuclear North Korea: A complete collapse of the North Korean regime (Jane Perlez, “Few Expect China to Punish North Korea for Latest Nuclear Test“, The New York Times, September 11, 2016). Such a collapse could mean an outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula, massive refugee flows into the Chinese border regions and the import of political unrest. Moreover, in the event of Korea being reunified under the leadership of South Korea, China would lose an anti-American buffer state and would simultaneously be confronted with a confident US ally. Access to North Korean mineral resources would also become a thing of the past (Roy, p. 143). Due to the “Pivot to East Asia“, perceived by China as a US containment strategy, China’s confidence in the US is not so strong that it would be prepared to take the risk of such possible scenarios becoming reality. More stringent sanctions – even unilaterally by the United States and its allies – are indeed possible, but without rigorous enforcement on the part of China, these would not achieve the desired effect.
The hope of the US that the North Korean regime will collapse in the meantime and thus resolve the problem itself lis unrealistic. Not only is the population accustomed to the meagre living conditions, it has been internationally isolated and indoctrinated with a state ideology for over at least three generations, which the Kim dynasty places above all else, while blaming the United States for the poor living conditions. An uprising on the part of the population is therefore unlikely. Furthermore, Kim Jong-un has consolidated and strengthened his position since taking power in December 2011, and has secured backing by the armed forces. A regime change would, in any case, not automatically mean that the problem of nuclear weapons and launchers would be solved, and that the relationship with the US would be improved (Cumings, p. 70f); Roy, p. 133ff). On the contrary, the situation could deteriorate uncontrollably through proliferation in other states or even to terrorist organisations. Therefore, the collapse of the North Korean regime would be a high, incalculable risk not only for China, but also for the United States, and is therefore not in their interest.
A photo of the North Korean news agency KCNA shows the test launch of a rocket which was fired from a submarine in April 2016.
What remains: Living with the status quo
Neither negotiations, sanctions nor the false hope of a regime collapse will bring about much change at all to the status quo in the long-term. A military option should not be considered; the risk of a second Korean War would be too high, in which an uncontrolled escalation and even the use of nuclear weapons could not be ruled out. Such a scenario would have devastating consequences for the entire Northeast Asian region, possibly even for the entire world (Chung-in Moon, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Search for a New Path Forward: A South Korean Response“, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, No. 5, September 02, 2016, p. 344).
The US and its allies will therefore have no choice but to resign themselves to the future status quo – i.e. a nuclear North Korea with intercontinental launchers. This also means that the further expansion of the missile shield must be continued on US territory and expanded over that of US allies, and that the US must have a credible and massive retaliatory capability. With this level of security, it would be possible to live with the status quo, especially if it is assumed that the North Korean regime would behave rationally. Kim Jong-un will be well aware that the first use of nuclear weapons would mean the end of his reign – whether by invasion or even by a retaliatory nuclear strike.
North Korea just stated that it is in the final stages of developing a nuclear weapon capable of reaching parts of the U.S. It won't happen!
Later, on December 5, after the Kuznetsov arrived off Syria’s coast, one of its Su-33s also crashed into the sea following a similar landing accident.
A photo taken from a Norwegian surveillance aircraft shows Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov in international waters off the coast of Northern Norway on October 17, 2016.
But is this deployment really necessary? Russia has already deployed a fleet of warplanes to Syria’s western coastal province of Latakia and has been bombing various groups across that war-torn country for over a year now. The Kuznetsov only carries a small number of fighter-bombers and because of its bow-ramp its fighters cannot carry as heavy a payload or as much fuel as their counterparts deployed in Hmeymim, meaning its contribution is a minimal improvement to the existing Russian air force in Syria at best.
Granted a couple of MiG-29Ks and Su-33s would complement the fighter-bomber fleet at Hmeymim, but certainly not drastically nor fundamentally. It is clear this deployment has more to do with a symbolic projection of power more than anything.
Recent satellite imagery reveals that the Kuznetsov has simply left eight of its assumed nine (ten before the aforementioned December 5 incident) Su-33s and one of its, now three, MiG-29KRs at Hmeymim to operate with the rest of Russia’s land-based aircraft. Leaving at most two Su-33s and two MiG-29s on the Kuznetsov. This fact alone demonstrates the symbolic nature of the carriers voyage since these jets — if they were really necessary in the Syrian theatre of war — could easily have flown to Syria with tanker aircraft in a much shorter space of time.
Iran quickly tired of Russia’s boasting of its strategic position from Iranian territory and the Tu-22M3s were no longer permitted to use Hamadan as a launchpad. But that brief deployment nevertheless enabled the Russians to pound their adversaries across Syria in ways the Kuznetsov flotilla could only dream.
It’s for these simple reasons that the closely observed voyage of the Kuznetsov flotilla to the Syrian coast can be interpreted as more a symbolic projection of Russian power than a practical one. The aforementioned Su-33 and MiG-29K crashes demonstrate the difficulties the crew of the carrier have faced operating it. Also, more broadly, it indicates that this is an overly unnecessary, burdensome and risky deployment done simply in order to add another dozen or so light fighter-bombers to the sizeable air arm already in Syria.
This is the first time the Kuznetsov will see combat. Moscow’s deployment in Syria was also the first time Moscow fired its Kalibr cruise missiles in combat. On different occasions the cruise missiles were launched from ships in the Caspian Sea (see video below) and Mediterranean, allegedly at Islamic State (ISIS) or other militant targets in Syria. Here also the use of such advanced missiles may have been more about symbolic power projection than the practical choice of weapon for targeting militants.
It’s worth addressing the fact that in Septmber 2014, the US also fired Tomahawk missilesat the mysterious Khorasan group in Syria at the start of its air campaign against ISIS in that country. Unlike Moscow however Washington was, and is, not acting in Syria in coordination with the regime in Damascus. Early in its ongoing bombing campaign against ISIS in Syria, US fighter jets even carried HARM anti-radiation missiles as a precaution to protect themselves in case the Syria’s air defense would try to shoot them down. This clearly showed they didn’t rule out the possibility that Damascus would attempt to forcibly oppose their frequent uncoordinated violations of Syrian airspace.
From the start of its intervention in the Syrian conflict in September 2015 Moscow never had to worry about the Syrian regime attempting to hinder its operations. Russian warplanes flying from Hmeymim can bomb any militant target across the country with impunity, essentially making any usage of cruise missiles (which are an extremely more expensive way to target an essentially defenceless target on the ground than airstrikes) wholly unnecessary.
Nevertheless, using these weapon systems in Syria provides Moscow with an apt opportunity to test them in combat. With the Kalibrs to determine how effectively they can strike targets from hundreds of miles away and with the Kuznetsov to determine how readily it can be deployed and how effectively it can conduct air operations.
Ursula von der Leyen mit ihrem französischen Kollegen Jean-Yves Le Drian.
Der angekündigte EU-Austritt Großbritanniens wird für die gemeinsame Sicherheitspolitik der Europäer weitreichende Folgen haben. Mit dem Brexit droht der Europäischen Union ein massiver Verlust militärischer Fähigkeiten, schließlich ist Großbritannien eine nicht ganz unbedeutende Militärmacht. Allerdings galten die Briten zugleich auch als die Hauptblockierer, wenn es darum ging, die europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik weiterzuentwickeln, z.B. durch die Einrichtung eines EU-Hauptquartiers. Für das Vereinigte Königreich hat die NATO stets Vorrang. Verändert der Brexit die EU-Sicherheitspolitik nun zum Guten oder zum Schlechten? Für die deutsche Verteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen ist die Antwort klar:
“Wir haben lange Rücksicht nehmen müssen auf Großbritannien. Auch weil Großbritannien konsequent diese Themen nicht wollte. Ich bin der festen Überzeugung, dass die teilweise Frustration der Menschen mit Europa, auch damit zusammenhängt, dass Europa, das die großen Themen bewegen muss, sich in einem Thema, wo die Bevölkerung sich einig ist, dass eine gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik das Richtige ist, viel zu wenig vorangekommen ist.” — Ursula von der Leyen bei der Vorstellung des neuen Weißbuchs der Bundesregierung im Sommer 2016.
Der Brexit als Chance für die EU-Sicherheitspolitik — diese Einstellung wird in fast allen europäischen Hauptstädten geteilt. Kein Wunder, denn die vor allem über die Flüchtlingspolitik zerstrittenen EU-Staaten brauchen dringend ein großes Thema, um die Union wieder zusammenzuführen. Im Mittelpunkt des Reformversuches steht der kürzlich präsentierte Katalog deutsch-französischer Vorschläge, mit denen die Kooperation auf dem Gebiet der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik vorangetrieben werden soll. Hauptvorhaben ist das von den Briten seit 2003 blockierte EU-Hauptquartier. Es wäre ein großer Fortschritt für die EU-Sicherheitspolitik, findet der verteidigungspolitische Sprecher der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion Rainer Arnold: “Natürlich wäre ein Headquarter sinnvoll, denn im Gegensatz zur NATO hat die EU den gesamten Baukasten der zivil-militärischen Kooperation.”
Diese zivil-militärischen Fähigkeiten könnte die EU über ein eigenes Hauptquartier besser koordinieren. Außerdem wäre die Union bei der Führung ihrer Operationen nicht mehr von den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten abhängig, denn zurzeit werden die Hauptquartiere jeweils von den größeren EU-Ländern gestellt. Die Anti-Piratenmission Atalanta der EU wird z.B. von Northwood bei London aus geleitet. Für den SPD-Verteidigungspolitiker Rainer Arnold würde noch ein weiteres spezielles Hauptquartier Sinn machen: “Ein großes Defizit ist, dass die maritimen Verbände in Osteuropa, also auf der Ostsee, immer noch von den Nationen alleine geführt werden. Hier würden wir erhebliche Ressourcen klüger einsetzen, wenn es ein europäisches maritimes Headquarter für die Ostsee gäbe — und daran arbeiten wir.”
Operation Atalanta: Das spanische Meteoro-class Offshore Patrol Boot ESPS Tornado und die deutsche Korvette FGS Erfurt sind beidseitig des chinesischen Tankers CNS Taihu bereit für den Nachschub auf hoher See.
Denn durch den Konflikt mit Russland ist der Ostseeraum wieder von größerem militär-strategischem Interesse für den Westen. Wären die Seestreitkräfte der dortigen EU-Länder unter Führung der Europäischen Union, würde das die EU als Sicherheitsakteur mehr auf Augenhöhe zur NATO bringen, so die Überlegung. Zumal die Militärallianz unter Donald Trump möglicherweise für die USA nicht mehr den bisherigen Stellenwert haben könnte.
Doch es gibt weitere Vorschläge, um nach dem Brexit die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik voranzubringen. Angestrebt wird, EU-Missionen künftig verstärkt gemeinsam zu finanzieren. Bisher müssen die Truppensteller die Kosten für den Einsatz in der Regel selbst tragen. Ein weiterer Vorschlag ist, dass EU-Staaten, die zum Beispiel gemeinsam Rüstungsgüter beschaffen möchten, dies künftig als Gruppe tun können, ohne dass die gesamte EU mitbestimmt.
Nicht zuletzt nach dem Wahlsieg von Donald Trump lautet das Motto der Stunde: Die in der Sicherheitspolitik dominanten Egoismen der Nationalstaaten müssen überwunden werden. Mehr gemeinsame Strategie und Ressourcenplanung sollen die EU-Sicherheitspolitik effektiver machen. Auf dem EU-Gipfel im Dezember 2016 wollen die Staats- und Regierungschefs die entsprechenden Weichen stellen. Was der Öffentlichkeit als großer strategischer Aufbruch zu einer besseren EU-Sicherheitspolitik verkauft wird, sieht Christian Mölling vom German Marshall Fund in Berlin allerdings kritisch: “Das Problem ist, wie immer bei diesen Aktionen, dass sie natürlich sehr kurzfristig gedacht sind und erstmal überhaupt nicht mit Fähigkeiten oder Überlegungen hin – Wie kann ich das eigentlich mit militärischen Fähigkeiten hinterlegen? Das hat dabei überhaupt keine Rolle gespielt. Und das droht der EU, wie so oft, wieder auf die Füße zu fallen.”
Ein Beispiel für diesen Mangel an strategischer Planung ist der deutsch-französische Vorschlag, ein EU-Sanitätskommando aufzubauen. Dadurch soll bei Missionen die medizinische Versorgung und gegebenenfalls die Evakuierung der Soldaten verbessert werden. Wichtige Ressource dafür wäre ein gemeinsamer Hubschrauberverband der Europäer. Den gibt es aber nicht. Der von der Bundeswehr vor zwei Jahren unternommene Versuch, zusammen mit anderen EU-Streitkräften einen solchen Truppenteil aufzubauen, kommt nicht voran.
Am 6. April 2016 besuchte die deutsche Bundesverteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen im malischen Bamako die Ausbildungsmission EUTM. Sie ist eine von 30 Missionen von EU-Ländern in aller Welt.
Eine wichtige Rolle bei der angestrebten Stärkung der EU-Sicherheitspolitik spielt auch das Geld. Nach Ansicht von Experten kann die EU auf diesem Gebiet auf Dauer nur effektiv sein, wenn die Mitgliedsstaaten der Union hierfür ständig entsprechende Mittel bereitstellen und der EU sogar ein eigenes Verteidigungsbudget zu billigen. Bisher werden die Missionen und Projekte von Fall zu Fall durch Zusagen der EU-Staaten finanziert. Und daran wird sich auch nichts ändern, glaubt der Experte für EU-Sicherheitspolitik Christian Mölling: “Ich glaube nicht, dass die Zeichen gut dafür stehen, dass man einen gemeinsamen Finanzierungsmechanismus für europäisches Militär bekommt; weil die nationalen Parlamente dieses Geld kontrollieren möchten. Und weil dann die Frage auftaucht, warum kaufen wir eine, weiß ich nicht was, westeuropäische Lösung, die aber fünfmal teurer ist als unsere eigene Lösung. Das werden viele Parlamentarier nicht mittragen, weil sie möglicherweise gar nicht sehen, dass das irgendeinen Effekt hat.”
Es bleibt also schwierig, die EU-Sicherheitspolitik auch ohne den Blockierer Großbritannien weiterzuentwickeln. Für Doris Wagner, Verteidigungspolitikerin der Grünen im Bundestag, überwiegen deshalb die sicherheitspolitischen Nachteile durch den Brexit: “Wenn man genauer hinguckt, sieht man doch, dass Großbritannien sich immer sehr massiv in den Missionen eingebracht hat. Großbritannien hat ein unglaublich großes diplomatisches Netz, auch jenseits der westlichen Staaten. Ich glaube, es wäre ein großer Verlust.”
Gerade in Afrika, das spätestens seit der Flüchtlingskrise für Europa von besonderem Interesse ist, sind die Briten neben den Franzosen stark engagiert. Die EU müsste ihre Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen in Afrika “deutlich beschneiden”, so der Wissenschaftliche Dienst des Bundestages in einer Studie, sollte Großbritannien nicht mehr in die EU-Finanztöpfe für Afrika einzahlen.
Grundsätzlich gilt: Die britischen Streitkräfte gelten nach den USA als die wohl effektivste Truppe des Westens. Die Briten geben erheblich mehr Geld für die Verteidigung aus als die anderen EU-Mitglieder. Ohne die britischen Mittel kann die EU nicht Global Player in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik werden – davon ist Sophia Besch überzeugt, Expertin für EU-Verteidigungspolitik am Centre for European Reform in London: “Ähnlich schwerwiegend ist auch der Effekt des Brexit auf Europas einsatzbereite Truppen. Zurzeit sind ungefähr 25 Prozent britisch. Dann geht es ja auch noch um die Beiträge zur europäischen Verteidigungspolitik, die schwierig quantifizierbar sind. Es geht zum Beispiel um die Qualität des Trainings bei militärischen Operationen und auch um die pragmatische Haltung der Briten in Bezug auf die Russland-Sanktionen. Ich glaube, dass strategische Autonomie ohne die Briten nur schwer möglich ist.”
Das Ziel der “strategischen Autonomie” steht für den Anspruch der EU, ähnlich wie die Weltmacht USA über das volle Spektrum ziviler und militärischer Optionen zu verfügen. Erst kurz nach dem Brexit–Referendum hatte die EU diese Zielvorstellung in ihrer ersten Globalen Strategie für eine Europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik postuliert. Ein Anspruch, dem sie wohl nicht gerecht werden kann. Vieles spricht dafür, dass der EU-Austritt Großbritanniens die Union auf diesem Gebiet schwächen wird. Es sieht nicht danach aus, dass dieses Defizit durch die jetzt geplante Reformagenda wettgemacht werden kann. Dabei wäre nach dem Wahlsieg von Donald Trump ein sicherheitspolitisch handlungsfähiges Europa dringlicher denn je.
For a brief period between November 12 and 20 Turkish jets did not enter Syrian airspace to support its FSA proxy. This was because the Syrian regime activated its air defense systems and threatened to shoot down any Turkish jets following Turkey’s bombing of SDF positions on October 19 – which Ankara carried out to prevent a Kurdish-led advance from the city of Manbij (which was captured from ISIS in August) to al-Bab.
Both, the Syrian and Turkish militaries have been considerable weakened by different internal events. Since 2011 the Syrian Army’s manpower has been gradually sapped by this costly war of attrition and desertions. At present, al-Assad’s army is so overstretched it relies heavily on support from militias. The Turkish Army, on the other hand, has faced large-scale purges following the July 15 coup attempt, with tens-of-thousands of personnel being detained and a reignited Kurdish insurgency in Turkey’s eternally volatile southeast. The question of whether it remains even functional has been raised in the Turkish press. The Turkish Air Forces’ ability to field large numbers of its jet fighters is also in question given the large number of pilots who have been discharged.
Rebel fighters gather during their advance towards the Islamic State-held city of al-Bab, northern Syria October 26, 2016 (Photo: Khalil Ashawi).
Aside from activating its air defenses and threatening to shoot down Turkish jets, Syria has demonstrated that it is willing to forcibly resist a Turkish advance on al-Bab. A Syrian helicopter dropped barrel bombs on Turkey’s FSA proxies in the village of Tal Nayif, south-east of Dabiq, on October 26, killing two of the FSA-rebels and wounding five. More alarmingly, the Turkish Army announced on November 24 that a Syrian airstrike killed three of their soldiers in Syria. How far both sides are willing to, and can, escalate clashes is unclear given the reluctance of their powerful patrons to support them and the aforementioned state of their armed forces.
Beginning on August 24, operation “Euphrates Shield” has been relatively ramshackle, relying on an estimated 1,500-3,000 relatively basically trained irregular FSA fighters to advance and rout ISIS with heavy fire support. Some of these fighters have already been killed in deadly ISIS ambushes and by ISIS’s notoriously lethal booby traps. And this has only been in fighting the militants in relatively small villages and towns. Al-Bab on the other hand is a city with a pre-war population of no fewer than 60,000 people – some estimates even put the population in the area as high as 100,000. The recapture of the border city of Jarablus in late August was a cakewalk for the Turks since ISIS clearly choose not to fight for a city on the periphery of its self-styled state. Al-Bab is 30 kilometers south of the Turkish border and ISIS have likely fortified their position there very well and are capable of bleeding out Turkey’s FSA proxies. A prolonged and bloody battle could be about to transpire.
US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) officially announcing start of Raqqa offensive against Islamic State (ISIS) earlier in November 2016.
The US has clearly thrown in its lot with the SDF, who have proven themselves a much more reliable and competent force against ISIS than the FSA forces. Manbij has a larger population than al-Bab (pre-war estimates put it at approximately 75,000) and the SDF were able to capture it using no less than 2,000 fighters with US-led coalition air support. That campaign took over two months but was still relatively decisive.
The SDF have also proven themselves as disciplined battle-hardened fighters, which is why Washington has chosen them to spearhead the Raqqa offensive, that they began earlier this month. The US will neither oppose Ankara in its fight against ISIS nor support its al-Bab offensive. The US has no interest in Turkey going on to fight the Kurds in Manbij after the al-Bab campaign, which is Turkey’s stated objective. A such move could ultimately compromise the SDF’s offensive against Raqqa, the crown jewel of the Syrian wing of ISIS’s terror state.
A long drawn out battle for al-Bab that could sap the Turkish-backed FSA factions manpower would be a blow to Turkey’s three-month-old Euphrates Shield operation and Ankara’s long sought goal to be a major power broker in the Syrian conflict in general.
As American advisors return to Lashkar Gah to bolster the Afghan policemen and soldiers besieged there, Western countries experienced in combating ISIS and al-Qaeda are struggling to counter the Taliban’s rapid advances. In fact, there is a relationship between the militants’ fortunes: the Taliban’s methods mimic ISIS’s military strategies and al-Qaeda’s political tactics, their strongest points.
The Taliban Fights Like ISIS
Unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS achieved fame and notoriety not for its spectacular acts of terrorism but for its startling victories as an irregular military. Before Western intervention in 2014, ISIS had routed the Syrian opposition, the Iraqi and Syrian militaries through a combination of blitzkrieg and guerilla warfare. It ambushed, outmaneuvered, and overwhelmed them.
Similar to ISIS, the insurgents cite Islam to justify violent strategies and provide religious legitimacy. “Martyrdom operations have had a very effective, influential impact in the history of Islamic jihad,” said Muhammad Yousuf Ahmadi, a Taliban spokesman, in reference to the Taliban’s use of suicide attacks. He asserted that Islamic theologians had condoned “martyrdom operations” (see also David Bukay, “The Religious Foundations of Suicide Bombings“, Middle East Quarterly 13, no. 4, Fall 2006, p. 27–36).
Following in the footsteps of all successful drug cartels and terrorist organizations, the Taliban rarely tolerates rivals. It has subdued other Afghan insurgents, including some of ISIS’s affiliates in Afghanistan. These methods have ensured the Taliban’s hegemony in the insurgency against the Afghan government. In Iraq and Syria, ISIS has used the same strategy with much success.
Taliban attack on Afghanistan police cadets near Kabul kills dozens end of June 2016.
The Taliban Thinks Like al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda, unlike ISIS, has emphasized political flexibility at the expense of its Islamist ideology. The Syrian Civil War offers an important case study. There, al-Qaeda’s affiliate worked with other rebels — even Western-backed secularists — to overthrow the Syrian government rather than establish an Islamic state. Grassroots support worked better than did top-down control.
Later, al-Qaeda’s leadership allowed its Syrian affiliate to sever ties to the terrorist organization for political and tactical benefits: without links to an Egyptian-heavy leadershipbased in Pakistan, the former affiliate could better cooperate with other Syrian rebels. Al-Qaeda has prioritized local political considerations in Syria over an emirate or a worldwide caliphate.
Just as al-Qaeda was willing to coordinate with American-friendly moderates in Syria, the Taliban has cooperated with current and former enemies to realize its goals. The Western news media accused the insurgents of sharing intelligence on ISIS with Iran, which has fought the Taliban, and Russia, which had invaded Afghanistan and killed hundreds of thousands during the Cold War.
A deft manipulation of propaganda and realpolitik has brought the Taliban gains at home and abroad even if its popularity has yet to improve. The Afghan government’s own corruption and weakness has allowed the insurgents to make inroads in once-peaceful regions, where locals see the Taliban as an anti-government, Islamic alternative to cronyism and despotism.
The Quadrilateral Coordination Group, an intergovernmental organization composed of the Afghans, the Americans, the Chinese, and the Pakistanis and focused on bringing peace to Afghanistan, has given more ground to the Taliban in the hope that the insurgents will participate in the peace process. The American government has asked them to join negotiations even as it kills Taliban leaders.
Through over a decade’s worth of patience and a well-managed insurgency in the style of ISIS and al-Qaeda, the Taliban turned Afghanistan’s war to its advantage. Whatever happens to those two preeminent terrorist organizations as they decline, diminish, and disappear, Afghanistan’s insurgents have ensured the Taliban’s military and political longevity in the War on Terror.
These were some of the heaviest blows ISIS has been able to afflict against the incoming Iraqi Army in the Mosul battle. It indicates that the deeper Iraqi forces push into the Mosul metropolis the harder and more costly the fighting will be as ISIS use all available weapons they have in a last ditch effort to repel their enemies from territory they have conquered in the last two-and-a-half years.
The strike on the Iraqi tank highlights the growing proliferation of a weapons system in limited use by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan during the height of the U.S.-led wars there but is rapidly solidifying itself as an enduring threat on the battlefields of the future. — Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “This Video Shows ISIS Destroying an Advanced U.S.-Built Tank Outside Mosul“, The Washington Post,03.11.2016.
ISIS had already demonstrated that they have anti-tank missiles, which can have a devastating affect on enemy armor. In Syria they used such weapons to devastating affect against much older, and arguably far inferior, Turkish M60 Patton tanks which Ankara spearheaded its ongoing Operation Euphrates Shield campaign with (“ISIS Rockets Hit Turkish Tanks Near Syrian Border“, NBC News, 07.09.2016).
Using such missiles in an asymmetrical war can enable a much weaker enemy to exert a high cost on its attacking adversary, possibly even too high of a cost for that adversary to tolerate. Potentially enabling that weaker opponent to stave off what would otherwise be an ultimate defeat. As ISIS is increasingly surrounded by incoming enemies on multiple fronts it would make sense for them to unleash any weapon they can in an attempt to exert untenable costs on its opponents in hopes they can avoid a total defeat on the battlefield.
The militants have also demonstrated that they are not completely powerless when it comes to resisting air attacks. In late September the British Royal Air Force reported that their jet fighters have been targeted by ISIS launched surface-to-air missiles over Mosul, likely shoulder-launched ones. They had anticipated this since the US-led air campaign against the militants began in August 2014. Again, the fact they weren’t used until this late stage in the war appears to indicate the militants were keeping them in reserve for when they needed every tool at their disposal to try and defend areas they cannot retreat from, or cannot afford to retreat from.
Unlike the Russians in Syria the US-led coalition against ISIS has used such aircraft sparingly. In fact the AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships the US have deployed to Iraq in 2014 were only used on two occasions before their deployment in the current battle for Mosul. Once in October 2014 to force ISIS back from an attempted attack from Anbar Province on Baghdad International Airport and once last June in support of Iraqi forces fighting ISIS in Qayyarah south of Mosul. Their use in the current operation for Mosul is also reported to be minimum. This sparing use of helicopter gunships (which are great for providing close air support) may indicate the coalition is being extremely cautious over flying too many low altitude missions against ISIS, instead relying overwhelming on fighters and bombers to target ISIS from higher altitudes in support of the coalitions allies on the ground.
Nevertheless it’s also worth noting that the Iraqis on the other hand used their Russian-made Mi-28 and Mi-35s in the Fallujah operation against ISIS in support of ground forces over the summer without any losses.
While these separate incidents are themselves worrying put together they indicate little more than that ISIS is a formidable opponent when cornered. But ISIS’s possession of limited numbers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles alone won’t be enough to tip the balance against its vastly larger and superiorly equipped adversaries. The best the group can hope to do is temporarily hinder and bog down their ultimate loss of the territory over which their black flag currently flies.
Chinese and Russian marines on May 20, 2015 during exercise Joint Sea 2015 in the Mediterranean Sea.
China and Russia have often been bundled together as representing the single most serious challenge to the West. Without doubt these two states share a number of views on world politics and also have a host of similar interests. But it is where they differ that is more telling about their relationship with the West and the international order in general.
China, in turn, has been much more cautious. It chose predictability, favoring the United Kingdom remaining in the European Union and tilting toward Hillary Clinton as a slightly better option, even though there were voices in the Chinese debate favoring Trump.
If both China and Russia are dissatisfied with the West, why these stark differences?
The short answer is that China has much more to lose from the West’s decline than Russia.
The case of the Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant is a case in point. Brexit and the resulting change of the British government almost deprived China of its first nuclear power investment in the developed world. Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Theresa May, put her predecessor’s decision on hold, demonstrating reservations toward foreign investment in strategic sectors.
We will doubtless have a long wait before we learn whether it was pressure exerted by China that made May reconsider her decision, but the Chinese ambassador’s open letter left little doubt that Beijing would retaliate should London block the investment. Nonetheless, it was highly plausible that China could have suffered losses here.
For Russia, Brexit was a clear gain, not least because the EU’s attention was drawn away from the Ukrainian conflict.
Handshake between Jean-Claude Juncker, Li Keqiang and Donald Tusk at the EU-China summit, 29 June 2015.
The same logic applies to China’s relative preference for Clinton over Trump. Trump’s anti-free trade rhetoric is aimed directly at China. A trade war could undermine Chinese exports, especially given that the US is the largest external market for China and the biggest source of its trade surplus.
In the case of Russia, the risks related to the election of Trump are much vaguer and the possible gains are rather far-reaching. The volume of Russian-American trade is negligible while the chaos which Trump’s election may unleash in the West could help Russia achieve its long-term goal of dividing the transatlantic community.
Populists in Europe
The Kremlin’s support for European populist, anti-establishment and far-right parties also carries little risk for Russia and offers a number of benefits. Representatives of these movements openly declare support for Putin’s “strong leadership”, see Russia as the last barrier against the “debasement” of Europe and support Russia’s anti-American foreign policy.
China, in turn, expressed anxiety about the rise of populist forces as early as the 2014 elections to the European Parliament. Anti-establishment European parties see China’s economic expansion as one of the major culprits for Europe’s economic stagnation and the loss of jobs.
The European Commission’s anti-dumping tariffs targeting Chinese steel production are only the first sign of protectionism, which China expects will dominate Europe’s economic policy if far-right and far-left parties seize power.
Chilly body language on display as President Barack Obama meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin during the G-8 Summit at Lough Erne in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland, on June 17, 2013.
Differing interests Putin’s recent speech at the Valdai Club meeting offers some clues with regard to Russia’s policy. It is ready to embrace the anti-globalist movement, stir up discontent and fear against the supranational bureaucrats, global oligarchs and transnational companies. The invocation of terms such as “a simple man” and the “silent majority”, allegedly disenfranchised by their own elites, portrays Russia as markedly different from the allegedly corrupt Western elites, detached from their own societies. Russia expects to thrive on the potential chaos beyond its borders.
Such chaos makes it far easier to blame the outside world for Russia’s own failures and enables the mobilization of popular support for the Kremlin against the new “world disorder”. It also makes it easier for Putin to divide the Western community by cherry-picking potential partners.
The Chinese Communist Party, as much as it is able to despise Western democracy, needs the capitalist system to remain in power. China relies on open trade and stable markets, as well as on the growing, or at least not decreasing, wealth of Western consumers. It needs constant Western demand for its goods and capital.
The challenge to the West and its liberal values is real and comes from both Russia and China. It would be a mistake, though, to disregard the differences between the autocrats in Moscow and those in Beijing and to assume that their interests are the same.
The November 21 “Extended” update adds two more panels to the infographic: The transit of two Buyan-M-class corvette from Sevastopol to Baltiysk in October (the panel was already included in the first edition of the infographic, but had to be removed in the last update due of space problem) and the Russian strikes in Syria from November 16, launched with Kalibr-NK missiles from the Admiral Grigorovich. Additional strikes were made with 3M-55 Oniks — an anti-ship missile with land attack capabilities — fired with a land based Bastion AShM battery and with FAB-500 M-54 delivered by Sukhoi Su-33.
Aboard of the Kuznetsov, there are approximately ten Su-33 of the 279th Shipborne Fighter Aviation Regiment (at the moment, eight are confirmed by their serial numbers) as well as four MiG-29KR and MiG-29KUBR of the 100th Shipborne Fighter Aviation Regiment only set up in January, 2016. Sunday evening, November 13, one of these MiG-29 (most likely the one and only two-seated MiG-29KUBR on the Kuznetsov) crashed into the eastern Mediterranean after takeoff from the carrier because of mechanical difficulties. According to Russian defense officials, a rescue helicopter picked up the pilot, who ejected from the fighter jet (“Russian Navy MiG-29K lost in Mediterranean“, Combat Aircraft, 14.11.2016; Lucas Tomlinson, “Russian fighter jet crashes near its aircraft carrier in Mediterranean, US officials say“, Fox News, 14.11.2016). Additional to the fighter jets, there are approximately four KA-27PL/PS, two KA-29TB, two KA-31 and one KA-52K helicopters on board.
Arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Kuznetsov battle group probably will operate east of Cyprus near the Syrian coast till January, 2017. According of the plans of the Russian general staff, the fighter jets and the combat helicopter of the Kuznetsov should participate in air operations in Syria and in trainings with other Russian-friendly states, most likely with the Egyptian Navy.
The US Department of Defense frequently releases press statements detailing the targets US-led coalition airstrikes have bombed in Iraq and Syria as part of their ongoing war against Islamic State (ISIS) militants. These statements invariably describe how many ISIS vehicles, fighting positions, supply routes and tactical units coalition airstrikes have destroyed on a given day of the air campaign.
Since the Vietnam War-era the US hasn’t “body counts” as an indicator of how well they are doing against a particular adversary. While in this war, they do announce whenever they manage to kill some ISIS leader, they have, for the most part, focused on keeping count of how much damage they are doing to infrastructure in ISIS-held territory and how many of their vehicles and weapons they are destroying. For example the Pentagon announced last September that they had done serious damage to ISIS’s chemical weapon capability by destroying a pharmaceutical plant which they suspected ISIS had been using to produce chlorine and mustard gases in a barrage of airstrikes.
The US military is likely correct in many, if not most, of these cases. However, there is reason to suspect that there is more to these estimates and figures than meets the eye. When Syrian Kurdish-led forces managed to capture the city Manbij from ISIS in August they discovered a large ISIS stockpile of fake weapons, many of them anti-aircraft guns, which were clearly designed solely in order to deceive coalition jets – and possibly divert their attention away from targets which were of actual importance to the militants. The discovery of that stockpile raises serious questions about how successfully ISIS may have managed to fool the coalition about how successful their campaign against the militants is going, or how strong/well-armed the militants have been in the first place.
Even though ISIS is unlikely to ever get the upper-hand in this war it could potentially prolong the war against its technological advanced enemy by utilizing clever deceptive tactics as part of a broader range of asymmetrical methods to counter or put a strain on the coalitions resources.
Unlike the Russian Air Force in Syria – who have been dropping unguided “dumb” bombs from their ageing Soviet stockpiles – the US-led coalition has been relying primarily on more expensive precision guided bombs to target ISIS in approximately 12,500 airstrikes until end of May 2016. In total the majority of approximate 42,000 bombs dropped on suspected ISIS targets have been dropped by US aircraft since the start of this war two years ago. This has led the US to raid its stockpiles around the world as this campaign continues and even seek to build another 45,000 for future use, a clear indicator of how depleting sustaining this campaign has proven to be on their reserves (Marcus Weisgerber, “The US Is Raiding Its Global Bomb Stockpiles to Fight ISIS“, Defense One, 26 May 2016).
Between the beginning of the US-led air campaign against ISIS in August 8, 2014 to September 26, 2016, US Central Command estimates that a total of 31,900 suspected ISIS-related targets, ranging from Humvees to oil infrastructure, have been destroyed by coalition bombing. These estimates are based on the daily reports which have accumulated over the course of the last two years and could well include a number of fake targets.
As ISIS continues to incrementally lose territory and as coalition airstrikes are helping allied forces on the ground advance closer to ISIS’s primary stronghold cities of Mosul and Raqqa the coalition needs to be cautious that such deceptive tactics do not lead it to commit any fatal blunders.